White House Says Trade Wars Are Good, and Easy to Win Investing |
- White House Says Trade Wars Are Good, and Easy to Win
- The EU fires back by threatening tariffs on Harley Davidsons, bourbon and blue-jeans
- Trump Won’t Exclude Allies From Tariffs, White House Says
- dumb question -- how does money "enter the market"? If there's 100 billion on the sidelines, and it goes in to buy stocks, doesn't 100 billion worth of stock get sold and turn into cash?
- 40% drop in Universal Display (OLED) offers big opportunity
- HP Inc looks like a bargain with 30% upside
- Any thoughts on Netflix?
- Elon Musk's credibility on outlandish claims/goals: Revised & Updated
- Vanguard economic and market outlook for 2018: Rising risks to the status quo
- Thoughts on VFMO? (New Vanguard rule-based Momentum Factor ETF)
- Thoughts on Buffett's bet
- Found A List Of Every Buffett Insight Since 1977
- Insider Buying at LCI Industries as director James Geron buys $280,000 of stock
- Insider Buying at Andeavor Logistics as CEO buys $2 million of stock last Wednesday. Dividend of 8.6% has grown by 18% CAGR over the past 7 years.
- What was the best hedging you did, how did it turn out.
- This guy lost almost half of his 14k gambling on options in the last two weeks and /r/wallstreetbets encourages him to shake it off and try again
- What happens to my SIP investments made through Goalwise, Scripbox or other companies, in case (God forbid anything happens to them) they close shop lets say 5-6 years down the line?
- Thor Industries
- ENB: Enbridge / Why has the price fallen so drastically in the last month?
- The legendary Tesla Dielema! Let us resolve this debate through logic and evidence! Looking back at the price history of Tesla stock what information has spurred the price rise (be it speculation, news or earning) and given that information what would it take for sentiments and price to reverse?
- How could the tech sector be impacted by the recent tariff announcement on steel and aluminum?
- Real time probability index of tariffs?
- What was the biggest investment mistake you have ever made, and what did you learn from it?
| White House Says Trade Wars Are Good, and Easy to Win Posted: 02 Mar 2018 06:05 AM PST
From what I'm understanding, the White House administration is willing to have swing states targeted by EU/Canada/Australia/Japan/China's trade retaliations (e.g. soybean import restrictions), or is completely unaware of what happened in 2002. I wouldn't be surprised if the EU pulls up their old 2002 tariff retaliation playbook and goes after the swing states again. The question is how the White House will respond? EDIT: I also find it interesting that the White House does not trust steel imports from the EU/Canada/Australia/Japan, as they originally proposed the tariff as a "national security" measure. If they all turned against the US during a war (including NATO ignoring the US or disbanding), the US is screwed anyways. EDIT2: This trade tariff was blamed for helping kick off the Great Depression. Once that passed, everyone enacted trade restrictions against each other until global trade effectively collapsed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smoot%E2%80%93Hawley_Tariff_Act (I was strongly considering posting this in the earlier thread, but I had the impression that the White House was not planning on backing down after the tweet today. If the mods want this update in the other thread, I understand.) [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| The EU fires back by threatening tariffs on Harley Davidsons, bourbon and blue-jeans Posted: 02 Mar 2018 12:54 PM PST
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| Trump Won’t Exclude Allies From Tariffs, White House Says Posted: 02 Mar 2018 07:19 PM PST ""The president made clear these would be across-the-board tariffs with no exclusions," the White House official told reporters. "One problem with exclusions is that it's a slippery slope. Where do you stop?"" This can eliminate the idea that this would only target China. [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| 40% drop in Universal Display (OLED) offers big opportunity Posted: 03 Mar 2018 03:36 AM PST The drop followed knock out 2017 results but weaker guidance than expected - partially due to sales being pulled forward to Q4 2017. However the prospects for Universal Display (OLED) are huge with OLEDs being used increasingly in smart phones, large screen OLED televisions and even everyday lighting. Management outlined big opportunities more demand in the second half of 2018 and new fabs coming on in 2019. Universal Display, which sells OLED materials and licenses its OLED patent portfolio to the world's leading display manufacturers, looks well placed to benefit from the coming expansions. The stock is now trading on almost 30 times 2019 forecast EPS. But with 6 foot tvs going mainstream and huge opportunities in everday lighting, OLED looks well worth it. This post is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security or derivative. Stocks are not suitable for all investors. Please do your own research. [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| HP Inc looks like a bargain with 30% upside Posted: 03 Mar 2018 02:55 AM PST HP Enterprises was meant to be the star of the HP split But it is HP Inc (HPQ) that has shone brightest as revenues and profits increased strongly Recently reported Q1 results saw revenues up 15% driven by strong demand for ultrapremium notebooks. But the deskbook is also performing strongly and opportunities in 3D printing growing. The stock is trading on a forward PE of 12.2 times 2018 forecasts and 10.9 time 2020 forecasts. A more reasonable multiple of 14 would see the SP rise 30%. This post is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security or derivative. Stocks are not suitable for all investors. Please do your own research. https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/03/02/is-hp-inc-a-turnaround-buy.aspx [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Posted: 02 Mar 2018 09:53 PM PST Any thoughts as they've reached a recent high and jumped quite high in the past month or two, they seem to still be climbing with no signs of leveling off just yet, any thoughts? [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Elon Musk's credibility on outlandish claims/goals: Revised & Updated Posted: 02 Mar 2018 12:06 PM PST In November of 2015, I put together a bit of a timeline which ran over a few different instances where Elon Musk/Tesla made projections which ranged from mildly inaccurate to very inaccurate. Here is an updated edition which includes both the originally cited events and more recent ones. I'll present the information and let you draw your own conclusion on Elon/Tesla's credibility going forward. I'll also revise the format so it's easier to go through.
I'm going to add a component to this which I feel is necessary because oftentimes when I see a post/comment which highlights Tesla's inability to meet goals and/or deadlines, a Tesla fan (or investor) comes forward and questions its significance within the overall market - usually against automotive competitors. So, I'll compare projections for the Model 3 against the Bolt since those are both in the 200+ mile range EV segment. I checked various investor materials from both companies' going back into 2012 and coming forward to 2017. In addition, I checked media reports for general events. Here is when each company made projections of availability for the respective segment entry, when revisions occurred, and the actuality:
Note: There were a handful of mentions of the Model 3 in terms of future outlook which dated quite far back. The Summer 2011 letter included a mention of the then-called "Gen III", but I didn't include them as they were relatively theoretical in manner and not projections in any regard. They actively disclosed the project was on a TBD-basis so I granted them the benefit of said disclosure. Edit for disclosure: I have no position or plans to initiate a position in TSLA. [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Vanguard economic and market outlook for 2018: Rising risks to the status quo Posted: 02 Mar 2018 07:50 AM PST | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Thoughts on VFMO? (New Vanguard rule-based Momentum Factor ETF) Posted: 02 Mar 2018 06:08 PM PST US securities, they bet on recent high-performance to lead to continued high-performance. Looking at something for the kids, so like a 50 year time horizon, and it just sounds like a decent idea. Some stock fails to perform? They drop it and find another, I would hope. ER (0.13%) isn't even bad for that much active management. I dunno if there's enough brain power behind it, but I wonder if it could mirror something like POAGX as far as performance? That'd be dreamy... [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Posted: 03 Mar 2018 03:36 AM PST I think everybody here is all familiar with Buffett's bet, in which 10 years ago he challenged some fund managers to beat a cheap S&P500 index. The index absolutely crushed every single manager, and the Oracle of Omaha was right once again. To this observation we could add stories such as the monkey fund, which in 2000 outperformed the market by just having monkeys throw darts. Or the fact that studies show people with brain injuries are likely to outperform. Anyway, those could be anomalies or lucky instances, but they do pose interesting questions. To this I will add one more element. In late 2015/early 2016, before I knew anything about investing (not even what a P/E ratio was! or anything about the current state of the market), I opened a virtual portfolio, including companies I knew, liked or thought had a moat (not based on any research, didn't even know what a moat was). I did not do ANY research at all. Here are the results: https://imgur.com/a/C77RD I swear I did not fake this, or remove any company. Most positions are up 50% or more (average +58%). And this is slightly outperforming the market. I literally created this portfolio in 5 minutes. Now, let's compare with fund managers. Those from Buffett's bet, as he explained, were the best and brightest and employed thousands of people to do some research, directly or indirectly. This all begs the question: what makes a fund manager like Peter Lynch be so consistently good (+30% annually on Fidelity Magellan), when Buffett's bet clearly shows that most funds are trash? And I think we can also safely say that some degree of ignorance is clearly preferable when investing. Of course, that means investing in solid companies, not penny stocks or risky bets. But this explains the index, the monkeys, and the brain damaged people. As opposed to funds, which are constantly rearranging their positions. One last question, that I can't find a way to answer. Given the poor performance and the fees, why would anyone infest in a mutual fund!? [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Found A List Of Every Buffett Insight Since 1977 Posted: 02 Mar 2018 11:09 AM PST Here's some of the points: Edit - apologies for wall of text! Edit II: Here are the links to the full formatted list: 1977 Insurance & People - Insurance companies offer standardized policies which can be copied by anyone. Their only products are promises. It is not difficult to be licensed, and rates are an open book. There are no important advantages from trademarks, patents, location, corporate longevity, raw material sources, etc., and very little consumer differentiation to produce insulation from competition. It is commonplace, in corporate annual reports, to stress the difference that people make. Sometimes this is true and sometimes it isn't. But there is no question that the nature of the insurance business magnifies the effect which individual managers have on company performance. Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities markets at very large discounts from the prices they would command in negotiated transactions involving entire companies. 1978 Investing - We paid less than 100 cents on the dollar for the best company in the business, when far more than 100 cents on the dollar is being paid for mediocre companies in corporate transactions. And there is no way to start a new operation - with necessarily uncertain prospects - at less than 100 cents on the dollar. 1979 Operating Performance - On this basis, we had a reasonably good operating performance in 1979 - but not quite as good as that of 1978 - with operating earnings amounting to 18.6% of beginning net worth. Earnings per share, of course, increased somewhat (about 20%) but we regard this as an improper figure upon which to focus. We had substantially more capital to work with in 1979 than in 1978, and our performance in utilizing that capital fell short of the earlier year, even though per-share earnings rose. "Earnings per share" will rise constantly on a dormant savings account or on a U.S. Savings Bond bearing a fixed rate of return simply because "earnings" (the stated interest rate) are continuously plowed back and added to the capital base. Thus, even a "stopped clock" can look like a growth stock if the dividend payout ratio is low. ROIC - The primary test of managerial economic performance is the achievement of a high earnings rate on equity capital employed (without undue leverage, accounting gimmickry, etc.) and not the achievement of consistent gains in earnings per share. Inflation - the inflation rate plus the percentage of capital that must be paid by the owner to transfer into his own pocket the annual earnings achieved by the business (i.e., ordinary income tax on dividends and capital gains tax on retained earnings) - can be thought of as an "investor's misery index". When this index exceeds the rate of return earned on equity by the business, the investor's purchasing power (real capital) shrinks even though he consumes nothing at all. We have no corporate solution to this problem; high inflation rates will not help us earn higher rates of return on equity. 1980 Gains In Purchasing Power - Only gains in purchasing power represent real earnings on investment. If you (a) forego ten hamburgers to purchase an investment; (b) receive dividends which, after tax, buy two hamburgers; and (c) receive, upon sale of your holdings, after-tax proceeds that will buy eight hamburgers, then (d) you have had no real income from your investment, no matter how much it appreciated in dollars. You may feel richer, but you won't eat richer. Indexing - Indexing is the insulation that all seek against inflation. But the great bulk (although there are important exceptions) of corporate capital is not even partially indexed. Of course, earnings and dividends per share usually will rise if significant earnings are "saved" by a corporation; i.e., reinvested instead of paid as dividends. But that would be true without inflation. A thrifty wage earner, likewise, could achieve regular annual increases in his total income without ever getting a pay increase - if he were willing to take only half of his paycheck in cash (his wage "dividend") and consistently add the other half (his "retained earnings") to a savings account. Neither this high- saving wage earner nor the stockholder in a high-saving corporation whose annual dividend rate increases while its rate of return on equity remains flat is truly indexed. For capital to be truly indexed, return on equity must rise, i.e., business earnings consistently must increase in proportion to the increase in the price level without any need for the business to add to capital - including working capital - employed. (Increased earnings produced by increased investment don't count.) Only a few businesses come close to exhibiting this ability. And Berkshire Hathaway isn't one of them. 1981 Buying Great Businesses - Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share. Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior. Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad's body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company Target). Such optimism is essential. Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company Acquisitor want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own? In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite. We've observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads. 1982 High Prices - For the investor, a too-high purchase price for the stock of an excellent company can undo the effects of a subsequent decade of favorable business developments. 1983 Poor Industries - The projections will be dazzling - the advocates will be sincere - but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand. Last year, in discussing how managers with bright, but adrenalin-soaked minds scramble after foolish acquisitions, I quoted Pascal:"It has struck me that all the misfortunes of men Spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room." 1984 Stock Buybacks - The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a company's market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management's domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer. (To make the point extreme, how much would you pay to be a minority shareholder of a company controlled by Robert Wesco?) The key to a successful family business - All members of the family: (1) apply themselves with an enthusiasm and energy that would make Ben Franklin and Horatio Alger look like dropouts; (2) define with extraordinary realism their area of special competence and act decisively on all matters within it; (3) ignore even the most enticing propositions failing outside of that area of special competence; and, (4) unfailingly behave in a high-grade manner with everyone they deal with. (Mrs. B boils it down to "sell cheap and tell the truth".) Large Cap Growth An an iron law of business is that growth eventually dampens exceptional economics. just look at the records of high-return companies once they have amassed even $1 billion of equity capital. None that I know of has managed subsequently, over a ten-year period, to keep on earning 20% or more on equity while reinvesting all or substantially all of its earnings. Instead, to sustain their high returns, such companies have needed to shed a lot of capital by way of either dividends or repurchases of stock. Their shareholders would have been far better off if all earnings could have been reinvested at the fat returns earned by these exceptional businesses. But the companies simply couldn't turn up enough high-return opportunities to make that possible. Price Swings - Wild swings in market prices far above and below business value do not change the final gains for owners in aggregate; in the end, investor gains must equal business gains 1986 Family Businesses - Usually the managers came with the companies we bought, having demonstrated their talents throughout careers that spanned a wide variety of business circumstances. They were managerial stars long before they knew us, and our main contribution has been to not get in their way. This approach seems elementary: if my job were to manage a golf team - and if Jack Nicklaus or Arnold Palmer were willing to play for me - neither would get a lot of directives from me about how to swing. Working with people who cause your stomach to churn seems much like marrying for money - probably a bad idea under any circumstances, but absolute madness if you are already rich. 1987 Remarkable Businesses - Our premium of business value to book value has widened for two simple reasons: We own some remarkable businesses and they are run by even more remarkable managers. You have a right to question that second assertion. After all, CEOs seldom tell their shareholders that they have assembled a bunch of turkeys to run things. Their reluctance to do so makes for some strange annual reports. Oftentimes, in his shareholders' letter, a CEO will go on for pages detailing corporate performance that is woefully inadequate. He will nonetheless end with a warm paragraph describing his managerial comrades as "our most precious asset." Such comments sometimes make you wonder what the other assets can possibly be. Moats. Experience, however, indicates that the best business returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago. That is no argument for managerial complacency. Businesses always have opportunities to improve service, product lines, manufacturing techniques, and the like, and obviously these opportunities should be seized. But a business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error. Furthermore, economic terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a fortress-like business franchise. Such a franchise is usually the key to sustained high returns. Borrowing. Really good businesses usually don't need to borrow. Franchises - The record of these 25 companies confirms that making the most of an already strong business franchise, or concentrating on a single winning business theme, is what usually produces exceptional economics. Newspaper Business - It may not be coincidence that one newspaper leads in both categories: an exceptionally "newsrich" product makes for broad audience appeal, which in turn leads to high penetration. Of course, quantity must be matched by quality. This not only means good reporting and good writing; it means freshness and relevance. To be indispensable, a paper must promptly tell its readers many things they want to know but won't otherwise learn until much later, if ever. 1988 GAAP & Fraud - Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules "imaginatively" and record business transactions in ways that technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world. As long as investors - including supposedly sophisticated institutions - place fancy valuations on reported "earnings" that march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun. 1989 Buying Businesses - Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great showman but also a man of integrity. We bought the business without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on the plus side. "If you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler" makes sense whether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond. [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Insider Buying at LCI Industries as director James Geron buys $280,000 of stock Posted: 03 Mar 2018 02:07 AM PST The company manufactures components for OEMs in the recreational vehicle and manufactured housing sectors and has been benefiting from huge growth in RV demand coming from ageing populations and increased demand from millenials for weekend escapes. That demand looks like continuing. Q4 financials beat forecasts with revenue up 36% and net income up 22%. Management said on the call that backlog was at record levels and dealer feedback positive. Trading on 12.4 2018 forecast earnings the stock looks great value This post is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security or derivative. Stocks are not suitable for all investors. Please do your own research. https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/02/08/lci-industries-shows-no-signs-of-hitting-the-brake.aspx [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Posted: 03 Mar 2018 01:19 AM PST The company owns nearly 6,000 miles of pipeline and 26 million barrels of storeage tanks. Stock price is down 36% from highs but CEO thinks this is good value. This post is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security or derivative. Stocks are not suitable for all investors. Please do your own research. [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| What was the best hedging you did, how did it turn out. Posted: 03 Mar 2018 01:02 AM PST | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Posted: 03 Mar 2018 12:52 AM PST I thought /r/wallstreetbets was mostly a satire and people were joking around... and that they would give decent advice when it comes to stuff like this. The only acceptable advice would be to say "stop day trading when you know nothing." Yet people there are encouraging him to try again and make it back. Really? It was kinda fun looking at the dumb posts on that sub but if those people are actually being serious, then I am speechless. [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Posted: 02 Mar 2018 05:24 PM PST Can someone help me with this stock? Before the correction took place, I bought this at 143 after a minor pullback. But it has dropped significantly since then (118 currently). They are releasing earnings next week. Can only hope they deliver and the stock doesn't get killed more. Anyone that has great insight with this manufacturer, should I take my losses now or hold long-term? When do you think it can make its way back to 143? I seriously appreciate it. [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ENB: Enbridge / Why has the price fallen so drastically in the last month? Posted: 02 Mar 2018 05:00 PM PST I am a newb looking for insight on why this has fallen, your investment opinions, & where you see this stock in the next 5 years? There is a lot of intelligent people on here & I'm hoping to learn something new from the replies! [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| How could the tech sector be impacted by the recent tariff announcement on steel and aluminum? Posted: 02 Mar 2018 07:32 AM PST My portfolio is tech heavy, but I'm tempted to buy TQQQ (3x tech ETF) on a bounce bc the drop seems unfounded for certain companies and sectors. [link] [comments]  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Real time probability index of tariffs? Posted: 02 Mar 2018 09:47 PM PST | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| What was the biggest investment mistake you have ever made, and what did you learn from it? Posted: 02 Mar 2018 08:28 AM PST |
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